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Compared with much of Latin America and Africa, most Caribbean
countries have maintained stable democratic arrangements, despite racial,
ethnic and social divisions. These divisions and the resulting tensions
and conﬂicts are rooted in the region’s colonial history, the existing in-
stitutions and in political structures and processes. Governments, in the
name of nation building, have used various strategies to deal with dif-
ferences and tensions; they have also exploited conﬂicts and aggravated
inequalities. This paper uses country studies of Guyana, Trinidad and
Tobago, Jamaica, Cuba and the French Caribbean to study the politics
of race and ethnicity in the region, the conditions for accommodation,
and the challenges of reform.
1 Introduction
Arguably, the Caribbean region does not evoke the same level of anxiety as,
for example, countries within sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East. There
are perhaps two principal reasons for this. First, most countries have the
well-earned reputation of being relatively stable democracies. In the English-
speaking Caribbean, British legacies of constitutionalism, belief in civilian
supremacy versus military control, respect for the electoral procedure and for
bureaucratic and police neutrality sustain a certain democratic culture1,e v e n
where these fundamental principles are contravened and where the inherited
institutions are inadequate and ineﬀective. A few countries, such as Guyana,
the Dominican Republic and neighbouring Haiti, have had much more turbu-
lent political histories. The Dominican Republic, like much of Latin America,
has had its share of charismatic, autocratic and patron-clientelist political lead-
ers, bolstered by fraudulent elections and corrupt institutions. Dictator Rafael
Trujillo assumed government by coup in 1930 and was assassinated thirty-one
years later. (His was a particularly bloody rule.) Trujillo’s successor, Juan
Bosch, was democratically elected but overthrown only a year thereafter. Bal-
aguer, who had served as Trujillo’s advisor, was elected to replace Bosch and
remained in power until 1978, when United States President Carter pressured
1See A. Payne, ‘Westminster Adapted: The Political Order of the Commonwealth
Caribbean in Democracy in the Caribbean: Political, Economic and Social Perspectives.
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993 and P. Sutton, ‘Constancy, Change and Accommo-
dation: The Distinct Tradition of the Commonwealth Caribbean in The Fallacies of Hope:
The Post-Colonial Record of the Commonwealth Third World, Manchester University Press,
1991.
1him to accept that he had indeed lost the election. However, Balaguer won
again in 1986 and held on to power until 1996. Even away from oﬃce, Balaguer
had substantial inﬂuence on election outcomes, throwing his support behind
favoured candidates and using all sorts of wily strategies to exclude the op-
position, particularly Jose Francisco Pe˜ na Gomez, the despised black Haitian
immigrant. Reputedly, all the elections since 1966 were rigged. In 1994, critics
documented cases of opposition intimidation and electoral fraud2. Balauger, it
is claimed, was ‘ a diﬀerent kind of caudillo from Trujillo: he used more guile
than brute force, though his regime was still tainted by authoritarianism and
repression.3 Though there is hope that Balauger’s death will ﬁnally lead to
democratic consolidation, most commentators recognize that this autocratic
and patron-clientelist legacy is likely to have long-term eﬀects.
While the Dominican Republic is thought to have fairly favourable economic
prospects, Haiti has been experiencing protracted economic and political crises,
arguably since its Independence in 1804s. In Haiti, too, there has been a very
uneasy transition from dictatorship to democracy. Jean Bertrand Aristide,
who was ousted from government in 1991, returned to power in 1994—with
United States support—and was ousted again in 2004. Democracy did not
bring political stability. Guyana has had an especially fractious history, albeit
under the guise of democracy. Indian-African conﬂicts have helped to retard
democratic and economic progress. Cuba remains ﬁrmly non-democratic, re-
pressing freedoms in some areas and extending a range of social beneﬁts that
exceed those in many other Caribbean countries. Nevertheless, these four
countries are largely seen as outliers in what is generally regarded as a placid,
predictable and agreeable region.
Second, at least in public circles, many Caribbean governments accept the
inevitability and proﬁtability of the free market and globalization. Some of
these countries have stellar records in human development, which rival the
more developed democracies; others are beneﬁting from oil, tourism and oﬀ
shore investments. Therefore, the common perception is that the Caribbean
largely speaks the ‘correct’ language, has adequate pockets of wealth and well-
being and is not likely to present ‘uncontrollable’ threats. In reality, perfor-
mance records across the region and within countries vary. Low growth and
stagnation, widening inequalities and deepening poverty, domestic and inter-
national threats to major industries, emerging problems of insecurity, and the
2J. Hartlyn ‘Crisis Ridden Elections (Again) in the Dominican Republic: Neopatrimo-
nialism, Presidentialism, and Weak Electoral Oversight’ Journal of Interamerican Studies
and World Aﬀairs Winter, 1994, Vol. 36, Issue 4.
3Castro,M. ‘Beyond Balauger: The Dominican Republic in 2002’ North-South Center
Update 9/5/2002
2growing crisis with HIV/AIDS are among the risks to economic, political and
social stability. Those well acquainted with the region are keeping a watchful
eye on the persistence of old tensions, while attempting to diagnose the new
and evolving rifts. Many predict that without deliberate actions, social and
political explosions are possible, particularly in the more fragile countries such
as Jamaica, Guyana and Haiti.
1.1 Objectives and Outline
This paper uses select case studies from the Caribbean to (a) describe some of
the root causes of racial and ethnic tensions; (b) highlight diﬀering state re-
sponses to diversity, (c) outline the sorts of political and social responses that
are critical for ethnic and racial accommodation and equity and (d) identify
the challenges of reform. The paper emphasizes the legacies of colonial pene-
tration. Post-colonial Caribbean governments were revolutionary in many re-
spects but most were quite loyal to their frame of reference. In some contexts,
this continuity has had political value; in others, it has upheld preferential
politics and policy-making, social and economic divisions, cultural discrimi-
nation and inadequate representation of the countries’ diverse interests. Even
where governments have attempted to break with the past, strategies for na-
tion building have taken various forms and had diﬀering consequences. We
review some of the strategies, including the approaches to diversity and to
conﬂict resolution, the choice of constitutional mechanisms and solutions and
the adopted management methods and processes.
Section Two provides a background on race and ethnicity in the Caribbean.
Section Three focuses on Guyana, which remains among the more divisive
Caribbean countries. The Guyana case study provides a vivid account of colo-
nialism, post-colonialism and the cultivation of race and ethnic divisions. We
compare developments in Guyana with those in Trinidad and Tobago and ac-
count for the diﬀerences and similarities. Section Four uses case studies of Ja-
maica, Cuba, and the French Caribbean to highlight select political responses
to race and ethnic diversity and to discuss their advantages and limitations.
Section Five reviews reform eﬀorts and identiﬁes some of the constraints to
change.
32 Race and Ethnicity in the Caribbean: an
overview
The Caribbean has multiple cultures, languages and religions, diﬀerent—and
increasingly mixed—races. Distinct class divisions run across these. Using the
Linz, Stepan and Yadav deﬁnition,4 very few countries would qualify as hav-
ing multi-national features, though Guyana did seriously consider partitioning
the state in order to better accommodate its Indian and African populations
and Suriname5 was forced to use consociational arrangements to placate and
accommodate contending groups. However, in many countries, the ‘socio-
cultural’ divisions that exist are given political expression. Importantly, poli-
tics has been used to frame how these divisions are interpreted and to inﬂuence
the nature of the response. In some circumstances, politics has instigated new
forms of discontent. Therefore, the Caribbean comprises a range of societies, in
which it is possible to compare political responses to diversity and the politics
of nation building.
Belize is among the more plural of the Caribbean countries. Its population
comprises Mestizos (48.7%), Creoles (24.9%), Maya (10.6%), Garifuna (6.1%)
Syrian-Lebanese, Chinese, East Indian and Mennonites (9.7%). Suriname is
equally diverse, with Hindustanis/‘East Indians (37%), Creoles, Africans and
persons of Mixed European descent (31%), Javanese (15%), Maroons (10%),
Amerindians6 (2%), Chinese (2%), Whites (1%) and Lebanese, Guyanese, im-
migrants from Madeira and the Netherlands (2%). Guyana and Trinidad and
Tobago have signiﬁcant populations of persons of Indian and African descent
but also growing proportions of mixed races and smaller numbers of Whites,
Chinese and Amerindians. Apart from the Dominican Republic and Cuba,
where there are large proportions of Mulattoes and Whites, the populations of
most of the other countries are of predominantly African and mixed descent,
with smaller groups of Whites, Chinese and Indians. The variety of religions
- among them Christian, Muslim, Hindu and varieties of traditional African
and Amerindian—reﬂect the mix of the populations, though there are many
cases of cross-group religious acceptance and practice; there are, for example,
4J. Linz, A. Stepan,Y. Yadav,‘Nation State of State Nation? Conceptual Reﬂections
and Spanish, Belgian and Indian Data’ UNDP/HDR 2004 Draft, p. 5. The authors deﬁne
multinational societies as those in which ’social divisions have a geographical concentration
and are articulated in more than one ’nationalist’ vocabulary throughout the state’.
5See Edward Dew, ‘Suriname: Transcending Ethnic Politics the Hard Way’ and Brand-
Shute, ‘Old Shoes and Elephants: Electoral Resistance in Suriname’ in Studies in Third
World Societies, Number 43, 1990.
6Amerindians are descendants of Indigenous peoples
4Indians who are Christians and Africans who are Muslims. (See Table 5)
2.1 Race and Ethnicity
We are careful to distinguish between race and ethnicity. Conventionally, race
is deﬁned by phenotypical traits. Within the Caribbean, this may easily mask
the true nature of ancestry, as many—despite their physical appearance—
are racially mixed. A person of fair complexion, who is categorised as white
in the Caribbean is often regarded as ‘black’ in the United States, where
‘one drop of black blood makes one black’.7 Conversely, Caribbean ‘blacks’,
particularly those who are intent on repatriation to the African motherland,
are often surprised to discover that there are Africans who perceive them as
‘mixed’, ‘not authentic Africans’; some even dare to say ‘impure’. Similarly,
despite the ‘black consciousness’ within the Caribbean region, not all who are
classiﬁed as Afro-Caribbeans enjoy this association with Africa and prefer not
to be regarded as ‘black’, particularly where ‘blackness’ suggests links with
‘backward’ nations. Therefore, race is also socially constructed.8 Persons may
be lumped in diﬀering ‘racial’ categories depending on the country and region;
people ascribe meanings and stereotypes to groups that diﬀer physically and
may seek to pose racial distinctions in order to explain social and cultural
diﬀerences. Some of these ascriptions are localised; others become part of a
wider dictum. All such characterizations can be used to justify discrimination.
Ethnicity refers to shared norms, religion, language, historic leadership struc-
tures and processes, and other ties that may bind sets of people, beyond their
race; it connotes a form of ‘community. The common tendency is to portray
ethnic ties as superior to all the other bonds that groups may form and, con-
versely, to understate intra ethnic group dissent. This, too, politicizes ethnicity
and imposes social constructs. Ethnicity is widely equated with tribalism, and
depicted as the prime cause of conﬂict. Critics suggest that this ‘tribaliza-
tion’ of ethnicity reﬂects Western na¨ ıvet´ e. This argument has some merit but
should not to be used to mask the culpability of those political actors who
have corrupted ‘ethnicity’ to suit their own ends. In both cases, the natural-
ness of ethnic associations and the spaces available for inter-group ties become
blurred. Moreover, the ﬂuidity of culture and identity is ignored; instead, these
7Quoted in Zavitz, A. and Allahar, A.,‘Racial Politics and Cultural Identity in Trinidad’s
Carnival’ in Identity: An International Journal of Theory and Research, Vol. 2, 2, 125-145,
2002
8See G. Oostinde,‘Introduction: Ethnicity, as Ever?’ in ed. G. Oostinde, Ethnicity in
the Caribbean, London: Macmillan, 1996
5are portrayed as ﬁxed, organic, primordial.
2.1.1 Exclusion, Adverse Incorporation, and State Response
The Caribbean’s history of colonialism, slavery and indentureship makes it a
particularly complex region. Eﬀectively, Caribbean countries are reconstructed
societies in which indigenous populations were largely exterminated and groups
of immigrants (forced and enticed) were required to co-exist in order to pro-
duce for European markets and for proﬁt. These artiﬁcial arrangements were
sustained through heinous forms of subjugation, themselves justiﬁed by ide-
ologies of white racial superiority. Despite their limitations9, we can use con-
cepts of social exclusion to explain some of the processes and outcomes in the
Caribbean. Appropriately, we move beyond original interpretations, which
focused on inequality of access to goods, services and basic needs, and uti-
lize broader concepts of ‘exclusion from security, justice, representation and
citizenship’10and diﬀerent forms of injustice, from economic to cultural. We
recognize too—as the Caribbean experience clearly demonstrates—that left
unchecked, global systems of production can compound matters; they can in-
clude people and countries in economic arrangements that perpetuate their
social exclusion.11
Historically, people of colour within the Caribbean have been subject to
multiple forms of injustice, not to the same degree or in the same forms, for
a diversity of approaches was important to maintain stratiﬁed systems. (In
this sense, stratiﬁcation occurred even within the white groups. There was no
9The most frequently cited limitations of the social exclusion approach are: (a) the
speciﬁc priorities that the approach identiﬁes may be more applicable to developed rather
than developing country contexts; (b) social exclusion models tend to polarize exclusion
and inclusion, depicting relations between the powerless (the excluded) and the powerful
(the included); however, this overlooks one signiﬁcant feature of the performance of power:
adverse terms of incorporation; (c) the approach integrates various forms of exclusion and
does not attend suﬃciently to the distinctiveness of diﬀerent axes of exclusion, such as
is represented in social identities of race, gender and disability; (d) social exclusion oﬀers
the remedy of integration/inclusion but inclusion is not necessarily advantageous and can
have problematic consequences; social exclusion can support the status quo by encouraging
inclusion into the existing social system, without implementing the radical reforms that may
be necessary to address long-standing inequalities.
10Gerry Rodgers, ‘What is special about a social exclusion approach?’ in eds. Gerry
Rodgers, Charles Gore, Jose B. Figueiredo, Social Exclusion: Rhetoric, Reality, Responses,
ILO, 1995
11Martin Wolfe, ‘Globalization and Social Exclusion: Some Paradoxes’ in Gerry Rodgers,
Charles Gore, Jose B. Figueiredo, Social Exclusion: Rhetoric, Reality, Responses, ILO, 1995,
pp. 83.
6homogeneity there. Poor whites, the unskilled and those considered socially
inferior were still excluded from the circles of the nobility)12. Among the
workers, mixed groups received more favours. Their colour alone disqualiﬁed
them from the more strenuous occupations. Mixed groups, in turn, considered
themselves superior to Indians and ‘Negroes’.13 Indians, who were allowed
to retain their cultural practices were thought to be socially and culturally
superior to the ‘Negroes’. In most countries ‘Negroes’ were at the base of the
societies but this was not the case in all countries. Indigenous peoples, ‘most of
whom expired because they could not endure the rigors of plantation life’ were
displaced from their lands, marginalized to reservations and excluded from
political participation. It is diﬃcult gauge the depth of poverty and despair
that still persists within these communities, as statistical records are normally
outdated and inadequate, and policy-makers seem to misunderstand and/or
simply ignore the cultural norms and health and education needs within and
across these groups.
This long history of exploitation and racial subjugation produces certain
unique features. Thus, Robotham compares the eﬀects of transnationalism
in Central and Eastern Europe and the Caribbean and suggests that the
Caribbean diﬀers in marked ways. First, in the emerging market oriented Cen-
tral European democracies, global capitalism must eﬀectively rupture conven-
tional relations of power and property. The task in the Caribbean is somewhat
simpler. Here, in the majority of countries, the project is to realign structures
and processes, for the Caribbean has ‘experienced some of the deepest capital-
ist penetration for over 500 years’.14 Second, in the Caribbean ‘the white and
Anglo-American/European identities have established self-deﬁnitions much
more deeply driven by the historical experience of plantation slavery and the
slave trade. These experiences have shaped the deﬁnition of whiteness and
white hegemonies in deep contrast and contradistinction to blackness and black
subordination, as an entire hegemonic complex and structure’. Consequently,
the prejudice that is still directed to persons of African descent is of a diﬀerent
nature to the condescension to which persons of Eastern and Central Europe
may be subjected.15
12Edward Long’s description of the lower class whites is that ‘they have commonly more
vices, and much fewer good qualities, than the slaves over whom they are set in authority...’
Cited in Gibbons, ‘Ethnicity and the Democratic Challenge’ p. 4.
13The text uses the term ‘Negro’ to accurately reﬂect its historical, even though pejora-
tive, use in the pre-colonial and colonial period. Subsequently, it uses African and Black
interchangeably, as these terms became more acceptable in the late 1960s.
14D. Robotham, ‘Transnationalism in the Caribbean: formal and informal’, 1996 AES
distinguished lecture series, American Ethnologist, 25 (2): 307-321
15Ibid. p. 307
7Colonialism provoked white-black conﬂicts and but it also inﬂamed ethnic
dissent. The British, in particular, were the grand masters of ‘divide and
rule’; in all parts, they provoked and manipulated existing tensions. The
‘colonised’ were not entirely unwise to this and many of the personalities that
dominated Caribbean politics in the 1940s and 1950s built their campaigns for
Independence on their countries’ right to self-government and promised that
this would lead to better political and social conditions, including inclusion
and tolerance. Gibbons16 makes the interesting point that during this period,
‘ethnicity with its cultural underpinnings...did not inhibit the direction of the
democratic movement’, even within a context where ‘no more than 5 percent
of the total electorate had the right to vote, and property qualiﬁcations stood
in the way of the masses’.17
The problem for the Caribbean is that in most parts these original dreams
never materialized. It is true that global and domestic factors and forces
played a role in ‘redeﬁning the course’ but some political leaders have been
irresponsible; charisma has too often been misused, with costly consequences.
In countries such as Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago, for example, ethnic
aﬃliation—which John Lonsdale18 reminds us ‘is what makes us all human’—
has been used as one of the pawns for political mobilization and leaders have, to
varying degrees, reinforced forms and methods of colonial racial segregation.
White-black racial tensions persist in other countries. In Bermuda, where
racial segregation was enforced up the 1959, the Human Rights Commission
records high levels of racial complaints.19 In Barbados, where discussions of
racial tensions remained muted for some time, the National Committee on
Reconciliation (2001) reported that all communities feel aggrieved: whites
feel that they are constantly attacked for their ancestors’ role in the country’s
history; blacks complain that they are still denied equal access to employment;
Indians maintain that their culture is not recognized and accommodated.20
There have also been complaints of ‘reverted racism’. In October 2002, the
Africa Descendants World Conference Against Racism was held in Barbados.
Under pressure from British delegates, whites and mixed race groups were
expelled from the meeting. As far as one delegate was concerned:‘This is an
African family aﬀair and they should not be allowed to talk with us.’ There
16A. Gibbons,‘Ethnicity and the Democratic Challenge in the Caribbean’ The Sixth Wal-
ter Rodney Memorial Lecture, University of Warwick
17Ibid. p. 11.
18J. Lonsdale,‘Globalisation, Ethnicity, and Democracy: A View from the Hopeless Con-
tinent’ in ed. A. Hopkins, Globalization in World History, Pimlico, 2002
19K. Dill, ‘The Role of the Human Rights Commission: The Bermuda Experience’ A
Paper for the Cayman Islands Human Rights Conference, 10-14 September, 2001
20K.C.Babb, ‘Overcoming Race Division to Maximize Our Agency: The Caribbean
Women’s Movement’ Report for the World Conference Against Racism, August 2002
8was popular approval for this stance though notable African and Caribbean
delegates forcefully objected.21 There have also been occasions of Chinese-
black conﬂicts, such as in Jamaica in the 1960s. The history of party separation
and political violence in Jamaica is yet another form and manifestation of
‘ethnic’ (though, perhaps in this case, tribal) conﬂict.
However, racial and ethnic exclusion have not resulted in the widespread
violence that it could have. Governments have found various means of con-
taining or reframing dissent. In Jamaica, political leaders have been able to
create new alliances and build party identities that mask and, to some extent,
contain colour and ethnic biases. In Cuba, the revolutionary government im-
plemented vast structural reforms that privileged the lower segments of the
society and subsequently declared that ‘ethnic diﬀerences no longer play a
role in public or private decision-making’22. However, legal prohibition of all
forms of discrimination and oﬃcial silence on matters of race and ethnicity did
not eliminate the expression of private biases. Particularly since the economic
downturn of the 1990s and, with it, the reduction in Cuba’s welfare programs,
commentators have begun to highlight the growing social polarization, widen-
ing income disparities and re-emergence of purportedly resolved issues such as
prostitution, criminality and race. Some contend that racial inequalities have
always existed and that the ‘ultimate irony is that the same government that
did the most to eliminate racism also did the most to silence debates about
its persistence’.23
2.1.2 Regional ‘Ethnicization’: Haiti
Governments have also found various means to promote regional collabora-
tion and some are attempting to combat the economic and social polariza-
tion within the region. Jamaicans are regarded with some apprehension, even
within the Caribbean, and Haiti and Haitians have long evoked fear, initially
among colonialists and, subsequently, regional post-colonial and developed
country governments.24 Once regarded with pride among would be revolu-
21B. Wilkinson, ‘Barbados Racism Conference Expels Non-Blacks’ Associated Press,O c -
tober 2002
22F. McKnight, ‘Ethnicity and Social Structure in Contemporary Cuba’ in ed. G. Oost-
inde, Ethnicity in the Caribbean, London: Macmillan, 1996, p. 106
23A. De la Fuente, ‘The Resurgence of Racism in Cuba, NACLA Report on the Americas,
Vol XXXIV, No 6, May-June 2001
24See, for example, A. Maignot’s ‘Haiti and the terriﬁed consciousness of the Caribbean’ in
ed. G. Oostindie, Ethnicity in the Caribbean, Macmillan, 1996 and Brodwin, P. ‘Marginality
and Subjectivity in the Haitian Diaspora’ in Anthropological Quarterly Summer 2003, Vol.
9tionaries, Haitians have been subjected to discrimination and abuse within a
number of Caribbean countries and there is evidence of prejudice from coun-
tries external to the region. The Minority Rights Group and Anti-Slavery
International have documented the gross treatment of Haitians—including
children—who labour on estates in the Dominican Republic. These condi-
tions, they explain, are tantamount to a modern-day form of slavery. Without
proper documentation, Haitians have few rights and are subject to rapid de-
portation.25 Haitian migrants to Guadeloupe are treated as second-class citi-
zens. Haitians are often denied French citizenship and legal status. They are
relegated to the worst accommodation, are mistreated in the workplace and
frequently forcibly deported. There is little avenue for protest, even within
their own country, where Haitians also suﬀer human rights abuses.26
Persistent economic misfortunes and social upheavals lead many to conclude
that there is no escape from the Haitian condition; some blame ‘voodoo’ for
the country’s bad fortune. Paul’s27 comparative thesis of development in Haiti
and Bermuda attributes the beginning of Haiti’s underdevelopment to the
inappropriate land tenure system that P´ etion adopted. Compared with Saint
Domingue in the north (under Henri Christophe), where land was used for the
beneﬁt of the whole state, P´ etion parcelled out the land in Haiti, largely to
the mulatto elite, a process that produced vast inequalities and exacerbated
racism. Haiti still suﬀers from that legacy. Vast inequalities remain between
the minority Creole and whites and the majority black populations. These
are reﬂected in unequal access to quality education, health and other social
provisions. According to recent UNICEF statistics (October 2003), only 46%
of the population have access to improved water sources; 50% of urban and
16% of rural areas use adequate sanitation facilities; and approximately half
the population is illiterate.
2.2 The Role of Religion
Arguably, though religion causes some tensions within the Caribbean, it has
not been as divisive as race or ethnicity. In Trinidad and Tobago, and Guyana,
where there are signiﬁcant numbers of Christians, Hindus and Muslims, there
76, Issue 3
25Ferguson,J., Migration in the Caribbean: Haiti, the Dominican Republic and Beyond,
Minority Rights Group International, August 2003
26Note, for example, the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions reports that
there are threats, violence and even murder of workers who try to organize and advocate
for rights. Source: ICFTU Online 4/11/2003.
27Max Paul, ‘Racial Ideology and Political Development: The Cases of Haiti and Bermuda’
10is mutual cross group disparagement: Christians classify Islam and Hindu as
heathen religions; Hindus and Moslems, in turn, label Christians as cowards
for forsaking their roots and accepting the white man’s religion. It was not
until 1995 that a Hindu assumed political leadership in Trinidad and Tobago;
until then, power remained with the black and Christian governments. Some
commentators suggest that this had more to do with racial rather than religious
divisions.
There is friction, too, between Hindus and Moslems but these have never
materialised into the divisions and conﬂicts that are renown in India. In Suri-
name, Van der Burg and Van der Veer28 note that despite the potential for
inter-ethnic conﬂict, both Moslems and Hindus collaborated in their com-
petition for scarce resources; they formed strategic political, social and cul-
tural alliances against perceived Creole domination. Brinkerhoﬀ and Jacob’s
study29 corroborates these ﬁndings. Hindus and Moslems do ‘accommodate’
each other, which suggests that inter religious group conﬂict is not endemic.
In Jamaica and other parts of the Caribbean, Christians regard the Rasta-
farian religion as illegitimate, unconventional and heathen. Though there have
been notable improvements, Rastafarians (particularly up the 1970s) have been
denied employment and access to social services. In Jamaica in the 1970s, then
Prime Minister Michael Manley’s ‘association’ with Rastafarians, including his
use of reggae music to promote black awareness, resulted in greater tolerance
for the group. However, discrimination persists. In private circles, Rasta-
farians are still labelled as ‘ganga-toting laggards’. (Interestingly, without
accepting the religion, Rastafarian style ‘dreadlocks’ is now popularly adopted
(wholesale or in its derivates, twist or braids) to exhibit adulation for the
naturalness of African roots. There is now more limited demand for ‘hair pro-
cessing’, which is designed to produce straight, more manageable, European
looking hair. Outside of the Caribbean, Jamaicans are often forced to counter
the view that the entire nation is made up Rastafarians, with many of the
ascribed negative stereotypes.)
28Cited in M.R. Brinkerhoﬀ and J.C. Jacob, ‘Racial, Ethnic and Religious Social Distance
in Surinam: an exploration of the ‘strategic alliance hypothesis’ in a Caribbean Community,
Ethnic and Racial Studies, Volume 17, Number 4, October 1994.
29Ibid.
113 The Cultivation of Divisions in Guyana
The Dutch, who were the ﬁrst European settlers in Guyana, established plan-
tation production of coﬀee, cotton and sugar. The British, who replaced the
Dutch in 1803, continued to import cheap African labour for the estates and,
when the slave trade was abolished, East Indian, Portuguese, poor whites and
Chinese indentured labourers. Oﬃcial statistics (1993) identify several clus-
ters of settlers: Africans (35.6%), East Indians (49.5%), Amerindians (6.8%),
Portuguese (0.6%), Chinese (0.3%)and Europeans and a signiﬁcant mixed cate-
gory (7.0%). The majority of the population is concentrated on a small coastal
strip, which borders the Atlantic Ocean to the north.
Long before Independence in 1966, the dominant African and Indian pop-
ulations were separated on the basis of religion, race, culture, residence and
occupation. In the post-slavery period, most Africans migrated from the es-
tates and sought employment in the urban areas. By 1950, Africans dominated
the civil service and by 1964, constituted 73% of the security forces, 53% of
civil service positions, 62.29% of government agencies and 58.8% of the teach-
ing positions. East Indian immigration began in 1838 and continued to 1917.
During this period, 238,960 labourers arrived in Guyana. The majority chose
to remain in Guyana when their contracts ended and engaged in peasant farm-
ing close to the estates. Initially, East Indians refused to be acculturated and,
accordingly, rejected oﬃcial education opportunities. However, by 1964, so-
cial conditions among East Indians had improved dramatically. East Indians,
who owned 85% of land development schemes, had invested their fortunes and
educated their children. They now began to compete for government posi-
tions. Among the other clusters, some Portuguese immigrants returned home
with their savings while others entered retail trading, pawn broking and big
business. Similarly, most Chinese entered petty retail businesses rather than
remain on the estates. Amerindians, in contrast, were located in the diﬃcult
to reach hinterlands, though some now live on the coast and are occupied in
lower status occupations. It was mainly the Africans and East Indians who
competed for the scarce spoils that non-white segments were allowed. Cross
group rivalries resulted in polarization in almost every sphere, and was starkly
represented in politics.
3.0.1 Political Parties
In 1946, Cheddi Jagan formed the Political Aﬀairs Committee (PAC). The
PAC committed itself to ‘assist the growth and development of labour and
12progressive movements of British Guiana to the end of establishing a strong,
disciplined and enlightened party equipped with the theory of scientiﬁc social-
ism’.30 As with other independence movements, it was the middle class pro-
fessionals and intellectuals who led the PAC. There was broad appeal to the
lower segments of the society and the party attracted both African and Indian
farmers. However, even from this early period, there was evidence of distrust
between African and Indian labourers. Jagan recognized that diﬀerent cul-
tural values and occupational preferences, compounded by racially separated
settlements, would compromise political uniﬁcation. Voting patterns in 1947
conﬁrmed that despite its non-racial ideology, the PAC’s support was likely
to come from East Indian voters, in support of its East Indian leader. It was,
therefore, important to reinforce the party’s multiracial image through joint
African and Indian leadership. In 1950, Forbes Burnham, an Afro-Guyanese
lawyer, was recruited and he, with Cheddi Jagan, formed the People’s Pro-
gressive Party (PPP). Burnham was to serve as party chairman and Jagan as
party leader. The PPP purposed to end exploitation, secure independence and
build a ‘just socialist society’. This new multiracial image was highly popular
and the PPP won the 1953 elections convincingly, with 18 of the 24 seats.31
Six months later, when the PPP attempted to nationalize key foreign indus-
tries, the Colonial Oﬃce in Britain suspended the constitution, imprisoned
Cheddi Jagan and placed Forbes Burnham under house arrest. This precip-
itated a leadership crisis within the PPP. Britain clearly favoured the more
moderate Burnham. Its Commission of Inquiry concluded that intervention
could have been avoided if moderates had been in charge of the government.
Burnham and Jagan eventually split (Burnham to form the People’s National
Congress) and, with this, the party divided into ideological and, ultimately,
racial factions.
Hintzen and Premdas describe how Burnham then used ideology for political
ends. Signiﬁcant sections of the black middle class had rejected PPP extrem-
ism. In order to gain support from this group, Burnham began to disassociate
himself from the PPP’s more radical ideologies, ﬁrst advocating a mixed econ-
omy and later (1964-1968) supporting capitalist policies. Conversely, the Jagan
faction had now lost urban middle-class support and was forced to rely on the
rural East Indian plantation labourers. This group favoured the PPP’s radical
ideology and were attracted to the prospect of nationalizing key foreign in-
dustries. Jagan, therefore, maintained his ideological stance but surrendered
his biracial strategy. Prior to the 1957 elections, both political factions in-
30Quoted in P.C. Hintzen and R. R. Premdas, ‘Race, Ideology and Power in Guyana’,
Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, p. 177. Source: ‘The Aims of the
Political Aﬀairs Committee,The PAC Bulletin, 6 November 1946.
31Ibid. p. 178
13creased their racial appeals, which eﬀectively shattered any cross-communal
tolerance that existed. Jagan won the 1957 elections, and not only with East
Indian support; he had secured approximately 25 percent of the African wage
labourer vote. Recognizing that he needed a strategy to secure black lower
class support and his own political future, Burnham made increasing appeals
to race. As Hintzen and Premdas observe:
Race mitigated the importance of ideology, thus predisposing
the black middle class to accept a leader who was more leftist than
they would normally support while negating the objections of the
black lower classes to entering into alliance with those representing
the moderate interests of the middle classes.32
Premdas33 discusses the vast diﬀerences between oﬃcial party pronounce-
ments and party practice. From his investigation of party documents, both
the PPP and PNC proclaimed the importance of racial unity and insisted that
racism would not be tolerated. In practice, both made appeals to race and
fomented racial divisions. Between 1957 and 1964, there were intense strug-
gles between Indians and Africans, to the extent that various commentators
deliberated on partitioning the state. Premdas34 argues that neither party
‘adopted the electoral method unequivocally as the sole means by which it
would seek control over government’; instead, both used violence to threaten
the incumbent. In 1962 and 1963, for example, the PNC and the United
Front (UF) instigated violent demonstrations in order to upset the PPP. Ac-
cording to Ernst Halperin’s account of the riots, in 1962 there were protest
demonstrations against the government’s budget, which culminated in whole
sections of Georgetown being burnt down. In 1963, the PPP passed a Labour
Relations Bill, which the PNC refused to accept. The PNC called a general
strike, which lasted for eighty days, and included racial riots. The government
ﬁnally capitulated. Halperin concludes that ‘there can be little doubt that
both the 1962 riots and the 1963 general strikes were deliberate attempts to
bring down the PPP government’. 35 The Creole dominated public sector was
also politicized and mobilized against the PPP. Premdas36 notes that the Civil
Service Association and the Federation of Unions of Government Employees
32Ibid. ‘Race, Ideology and Power in Guyana’
33R. Premdas, ‘Competitive Organizations and Political Integration in a Racially Frag-
mented State’, p. 17.
34R.Premdas, ‘Competitive Party Organizations and Political Organization in a Racially
Fragmented State: The Case of Guyana,’ Caribbean Studies, Vol, 12, No, 4, 1973, p. 14
35See E. Halperin, ‘Racism and Communism in British Guiana’, Journal of Inter-
American Studies, January 1965, pp. 126-127.
36R. Premdas, ‘Race and Ethnic Relations in Burnhamite Guyana’ in eds. D. Dabydeen
14instigated demonstrations and strikes: a purportedly neutral civil service had
been converted to ‘a politicized instrument of power in ethnically motivated
partisan politics’. The Burnham regime that succeeded the PPP in 1964 also
became a victim of politically-motivated strikes, this time led by the Jagan
faction. In 1964, the PPP also used force in its attempt to prevent the holding
of elections. Again, in 1968, the PPP threatened that ‘guerilla warfare may yet
be adopted to attain control [of] the Guyana government’.37 This precedence
of resorting to violence and disruption (instead of constitutional remedies) in
order to resolve disagreements has resulted in enormous political, social and
economic costs in Guyana.
The early political leaders were to leave other unfortunate legacies. In 1958,
Burnham joined with the moderate United Democratic Party, which was led
by black professionals. The PNC’s ideology was now distinctly more moderate,
espousing a mixed economy of private investors and public interests. It was on
this platform that the PNC contested the 1961 elections, which the PPP won
in almost 60% of the constituencies. There is agreement that the division of
electoral boundaries favoured the East Indian populations. This was the prime
argument used (by both national and international opposition groups) to chal-
lenge the legitimacy of the elections and to pressure the British government
to change the electoral system. The British government, given its objections
to the Jagan administration, agreed to new elections under proportional rep-
resentation. British Colonial Secretary Duncan Sandys maintained that the
majoritarian system in a racially bifurcated state such as British Guiana would
spark animosity. Only proportional representation would ensure proper rep-
resentation of minority interests.38 The American government supported this
new turn of events. They had advised Britain that ‘an independent British
Guiana under Burnham (if Burnham can commit himself to a multiracial pol-
icy) would cause us many fewer problems than an independent British Guiana
under Jagan...An obvious solution was to establish a system of proportional
representation...because Jagan’s parliamentary strength was larger than his
popular strength’.39 However, this means of wrestling power from the PPP
only sparked more intense divisions. In response, the PPP vowed that ‘the
Sandys Plan must be stopped, whatever the eﬀort and whatever the sacri-
ﬁces’ and subsequently encouraged its East-Indian sugar workers to strike,
and B. Samaroo, Across the Dark Waters: Ethnicity and Indian Identity on the Caribbean
Macmillan, 1996.
37R.Premdas, ‘Competitive Party Organizations and Political Organization in a Racially
Fragmented State, p. 14.
38E. Halperin, ‘Racism and Communism in British Guiana’, p.128
39Cited in P. Hintzen and R. Premdas,‘Race, Ideology and Power in Guyana’ p. 183.
Source: A. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days, New York, 1965, p. 779
15thus demonstrating opposition to the African led Trade Union Council.40 The
strike was not entirely successful and, according to reports, party members be-
gan to victimize those Indians who refused to participate, and later diverted
their attention to black sugar-workers and farmers. Observers during the pe-
riod report various references to Africans as ‘murderers and rapists’41 Africans
later retaliated with acts of terror against Indian shopkeepers in Mackenzie.
Both groups were now highly polarized and those living in mixed areas began
to migrate to majority black or Indian locations for community protection.
Meanwhile, the new electoral provision allowed the PNC to form a coalition
government with the United Front party, and to win the 1964 elections. (The
UF, led by a Portuguese businessman, Peter D’Aguiar, was committed to free
enterprise and to preventing communism and socialism.), The 1964 election
results show distinct racial cleavages: The PPP won 45.8% of the votes, while
Burnham won 40.5% and the UF, 17%. Of these, the PPP won almost total
Indian support; the PNC won the total black vote plus support from the
’coloured’ population.
Post 1964, Burnham declared his intent to ‘win the next elections; win not
in the way we won the last occasion, forming a Government with another
party (the UF). We must gain an overall majority. This is not a matter of
mere pride. It is a matter of necessity, a matter of survival’.42 This was a
diﬃcult objective in a country with a majority Indian population. Recognizing
this, Burnham’s quest for power took a sinister turn. Reports indicate that
approximately six months prior to the 1968 elections, Burnham encouraged
a number of parliamentary defections from the PPP, thus gaining a majority
in the Assembly and control of the government. He subsequently rigged the
elections, with ‘tens of thousands of ﬁctitious votes’, even while the process
was supervised by a Creole dominated police force and military.’43 In order
to protect his position, Burnham began to systematically purge the police,
military and bureaucracy of non-Africans and non-supporters. (See Tables 1
and 2) The security and armed forces were then expanded with Afro (pro-PNC)
Guyanese so that:
[Whereas] ‘in 1964, the police and auxiliary armed forces num-
40Halperin, p. 129
41Ibid, p. 130
42Quoted in R. Premdas, ‘Competitive Organizations and Political Integration in a
Racially Fragmented State’, p. 16. Source: Address by the Honourable L.F.S. Burnham to
the 11th Congress of the People’s National Congress, Sunday, April 14, 1968. Georgetown:
The Daily Chronicle Press, p. 18
43Premdas, ‘Race and Ethnic Relations in Burnhamite Guyana’ p. 56
16bered about 3770; by 1977, it was estimated to be 21751. In 1964,
there was one military person to 284 civilians; in 1976, it was one
for every 37 citizens. The budgetary allocation for the military
rose from 0.21% in 1965 to 8% in 1973 to 14.2% in 1976. That
is, an increase of over 4000%...More than any other public ser-
vice department, the police and coercive forces were overwhelmed
by Afro-Guyanese. Burnham named himself Chairman of the De-
fence Board, where he took personal control over promotions and
appointments.44
Burnham now resorted to his radical ideological stance. In 1970, he declared
Guyana a ‘Cooperative Republic’, nationalized over 80% of the industries and
ﬁlled the public sector with party appointees. Premdas quotes Professor Man-
dle’s observation of the new state of aﬀairs:
The older colonial ruling class and its business ﬁrms have been
banished and decision-making power now rests with a local elite of
state and cooperative-based managers. In the Guyanese context,
this assumes the form of the emergence of an urban Afro-Guyanese
leadership under the auspices of the People’s National Congress.45
There was mass migration from Guyana, especially of Europeans, Chinese
and Portuguese. The United States withdrew its support and the economy was
‘besieged by high unemployment (20-30%, double digit inﬂation, prohibitive
fuel costs, demonstrations, boycotts and strikes’.46
Burnhman’s regime lasted for 21 years, until his death in 1985. He secured
his regime through various forms of repression. Clive Thomas described the
period as the ‘fascistisation’ of the state:
In this stage political assassination, direct repression of all pop-
ular manifestations, and a rapid growth of the security apparatuses
of the state take place. These developments are ‘propagandised’
with the familiar claims of ‘law and order’, ‘the necessities of de-
velopment of a poor country’, and ‘we cannot aﬀord the luxuries
44I b i d .p .5 7
45Ibid., p. 57. Source: J. Mandle, ‘Continuity and Change in Guyanese Undevelopment’
Monthly Review Vol. 21, no. 2, September 1976.
46Ibid., p. 56
17of democracy’. The fascistisation of the state is now very much on
the way and from here on, the government through state manip-
ulation, propaganda and force, make it unmistakably clear that it
cannot be changed by legal or constitutional means’47
These types of legacies do not simply disappear. Patterns of strikes and
counter-strikes followed into subsequent administrations. Perry Mars48 shows
that though there have been modest attempts at reconciliation, many of these
were rejected by the Opposition. In other cases, promises of reconciliation
made during pre-election campaigns have not been honoured. (See Tables 3
and 4)
The current PPP government, under Bharrat Jagdeo’s leadership, has of-
fered opportunities for reconciliation and collaboration across the parties. In
1999, he invited the PNC leadership to ‘sit with us and iron out diﬀerences
so that we can have a common cause to serve’.49 Subsequently, a number of
bipartisan committees were formed to address local government reform, bor-
der and national security, distribution of land and houselots, resuscitation of
the bauxite industry, depressed communities needs, radio- monopoly and non-
partisan boards.’ PNC representatives were also appointed to serve on state
boards. However in March 2002, the PNC suspended dialogue, alleging that
agreements had been breached.
3.0.2 A Note on Trinidad and Tobago
Trinidad and Tobago, despite its racial divisions and conﬂicts, still does not
have the record of extreme polarization and frequent social and political explo-
sion that Guyana does. Arguably, Trinidad and Tobago has had a somewhat
more conciliatory political history and its more favourable economic position
has, in part, helped to temper racial mobilization. Nevertheless, there is the
lurking fear that without careful management, ‘Guyana-style politics’ could
become the norm in Trinidad and Tobago. Some contend that the new lev-
47C.Y.Thomas, ‘State Capitalism in Guyana: An Assessment of Burnham’s Cooperative
Republic’ in ed. F. Ambursely and R. Cohen, Crisis in the Caribbean New York: Monthly
Review Press, 1983
48P.Mars,‘State Intervention and Conﬂict Resolution: Guyana and the Caribbean Expe-
rience’, Comparative Politics, Vol. 27, No. 2, Jan. 1995, pp. 167-186 and P. Mars, ‘Ethnic
Conﬂicts in Guyana’, Journal of Peace Research, Volume 38, 3, May 2001, pp. 352-371
49PPP/C Government, ‘Towards Greater Inclusive Governance in Guyana’ State House,
February 8, 2003.
18els of racial discord in contemporary political debates are swiftly leading the
country in that unfortunate direction.
Malcolm Cross50explains that the diﬀerences in East-Indian-Creole relations
in both countries started from Indentureship. Arguably, Trinidadian planters
were no less disposed to stirring racial animosities. Indeed, in Trinidad too,
planters capitalized on existing stereotypes, including the view that Indians
were the more adept at industry. Yet, there were deﬁnite diﬀerences in policy
administration that raised the level of conﬂict and competition in Guyana.
For example, Cross argues that though the government in British Guiana did
not favour land settlement schemes, the schemes that existed were ‘for the sole
beneﬁt of Indians’ and may have been ‘a policy which aggravated the sense of
frustration and bitterness felt by the dispossessed Creoles’. In Trinidad and
Tobago by contrast, land was not distributed along racial lines. Most squatters
were granted legal rights, and land was much less costly (and less cumbersome)
to acquire. This allowed both Africans and Indians to establish an economic
base. Though Indians seemed to favour farming and blacks, more urban based
occupations, the group of independent smallholders that emerged after 1898
comprised both Indians and Africans. In addition, Trinidad’s economy was
more diverse and oﬀered opportunities in both sugar and cocoa. In Guiana by
contrast, Africans considered themselves ‘a race in decline’, rendered landless
and without acceptable social provision.
Various scholars argue that Trinidad and Tobago’s more favourable economic
position has allowed both Africans and Indians to proﬁt in ways that groups
in Guyana have not. Petroleum was discovered early in the twentieth century
and became the dominant export earner, replacing sugar, coﬀee and cocoa. In
many respects, oil production became associated with Africans, and though
they did not remain on the estates, sugar production was considered the Indi-
ans’ domain. French Creoles managed the multinational businesses.51 While
both Africans and Indians have protested about the ways in which economic
gains were/are managed, there is little doubt that Trinidad and Tobago and
Guyana have long had starkly diﬀerent levels of cross-group economic welfare,
with diﬀerent consequences for the levels of ethnic conﬂict. Arguably, with
higher levels of poverty in Guyana, the electorate is more easily incited; in
Trinidad, there is marked voter apathy, which is reﬂected in consistently low
50M. Cross, ‘East Indian-Creole relations in Trinidad and Guiana in the late nineteenth
century’ in eds. D. Dabydeen and B. Samaroo, Across the Dark Waters: Ethnicity and
Indian Identity on the Caribbean Macmillan, 1996.
51R. Premdas and B. Ragoonath, ‘Ethnicity, Elections and Democracy in Trinidad and
Tobago: Analysing the 1995 and 1996 elections’ in Journal of Commonwealth and Compar-
ative Politics, Vol. 36, No. 3, (November 1998), pp. 30-53
19voter turnouts.
However, there were also notable diﬀerences in political management. Cap-
tain Cipriani, one of the country’s most inﬂuential nationalist leaders, was
actually a white commander of the British West India Regiment who believed
that West Indians were fully capable of self-government. Cipriani became a
dominant force in West Indian politics, declaring himself a ‘champion of the
common people...[of] the barefooted man...[He] was acknowledged as leader
by hundreds and thousands of black people and East Indians’.52 As Selwyn
Ryan saw it, Cipriani’s whiteness proved an asset. At the time, Indians and
Blacks distrusted each other and he was able to bridge the gap between the
communities. Cipriani was attractive to the colonialists as well, who preferred
to deal with their own kind, even if he had ‘betrayed the race’. However,
Cipriani did not succeed in including the majority of Indians in the nationalist
movement, though they held him in high regard. Fearing assimilation, Indians
preferred to remain distinct and distant. Uriah Butler and Adrian Cola Rienzi
(Rienzi was an Indian agitator who the black oil-workers asked to lead their
union after the 1937 labour riots) succeeded Cipriani and also tried to encour-
age cross-group alliances. Yet, even from the earliest elections, race became
a major factor in voting. After the 1946 election, Albert Gomes commented
on the clear cleavages in the society and warned that ‘unless we can produce
in the next ﬁve years a fusion of the disparate and extraneous loyalties that
now bedevil us, then the progress of Trinidad as a cohesive organism is a mere
fantastic notion of the idealists in our midsts’.53
The People’s National Movement (PNM) and the Democratic Labour Party
(DLP) were formed in the 1950s. Both parties got majority support from the
African/Creole and Indian communities respectively.
Racial conﬂicts escalated during the People’s National Movement’s (PNM)
ﬁrst term of leadership. Ryan suggests that the PNM (which described itself
as multiracial but was perceived as a black party) had simply misunderstood
the Indian society; party leaders assumed that by gaining the alliance of urban
Hindus, they would then be able to garner wider Indian support. This was
not the case; Indians felt obliged to vote for the Hindu leader, despite any af-
ﬁliation they had to the PNM representative. Eric Williams’ criticisms of the
Hindi Linguistic movement, the Maha Sabha and the Hindu school-building
52CLR James,The Black Jacobins, New York, 1963, p. 403. Quoted in S. Ryan, Race and
Nationalism in Trinidad and Tobago, University of Toronto Press, 1972, p. 50
53Q u o t e di nS .R y a n ,Race and Nationalism in Trinidad and Tobago, University of Toronto
Press, 1972, p. 77
20programme further fuelled Indian dissent.54 Independence did not heal the
rifts. In 1955, Williams proposed constitutional reforms that would accommo-
date the ethnic and religious groups in government. However, on gaining oﬃce
he recanted and opted to follow the majoritarian system of government unre-
servedly: ‘any ethnic group which did not rally behind the PNM was either
recalcitrant, treasonable or obscurantist’. 55 Therefore, rather than facilitating
multiracialism, Williams attempted to build homogeneity. After Independence
in 1962, Williams attempted to improve relations with the Indian populations
through cooperation with the Democratic Labour Party (DLP)—considered
the Indian party—and through recruiting Indians into the civil service. Re-
sponding to criticisms that Indians were not represented in prominent posi-
tions, he appointed a Christian Indian to the post of High Commissioner. He
also acceded to requests for Hindu secondary schools and for oﬃcial recognition
of Indian religious festivals. Nevertheless, Williamss long period of leadership
was frequently dogged by claims of discrimination against Indians and of de-
nial of Indian contributions to society and culture. Conversely, the majority
of blacks maintained that the PNM failed to advance the race, and that the
party prioritised the middle and upper classes. Black discontent exploded in
the 1970 uprising.
When Ryan wrote his text on Race and Nationalism in Trinidad and To-
bago, he concluded that younger generations of blacks and Indians were hopeful
that the race factor would subside in subsequent elections. Ryan, himself, was
doubtful. He warned that the majority of people tended to vote on the basis of
emotion rather than reason and that up to 1966, race was still a critical factor
in politics. La Guerre’s56 analysis of the 1981 elections suggests that race had
declined in importance and that conventional intra and inter-party divisions
had prevented a successful opposition challenge to the PNM. However, Pre-
mdas and Ragoonath’s study of the 1995 and 1996 elections in Trinidad and
Tobago57 reinforces the weight of race and ethnicity in elections. The PNM
remained in power until 1986, when the National Alliance for Reconstruction
(NAR) won, on what party advocates claimed was a truly multiracial ballot.
The NAR, which comprised disaﬀected Indians and Creoles, later split into
Indian and Creole factions and was defeated by the PNM in 1991. The United
National Congress (UNC)—the reformed ‘Indian’ DLP party—won the 1995
general and 1996 local elections. This was the very ﬁrst occasion in which
54Ibid. Ryan, p. 374
55Ibid. Ryan, p. 375
56J. Gaﬀar LaGuerre, ‘The General Elections of 1981 in Trinidad and Tobago’ in Journal
of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, Vol. 21, No. 2, 1983 pp. 133-156
57R. Premdas and B. Ragoonath, ‘Ethnicity, Elections and Democracy in Trinidad and
Tobago: Analysing the 1995 and 1996 Elections’ in Journal of Commonwealth and Compar-
ative Politics, Vol. 36, No. 3, November 1998, pp. 30-53
21an Indian-based and non-Christian government assumed leadership. Premdas
and Ragoonath describe the consternation that this virtual revolution caused,
particularly among the African population, who feared that Indians would
now remain in power, since they outnumbered Africans, and that Africans
would lose access to the opportunities they had secured over the decades. The
authors description of electioneering during the 1995 and 1996 elections is note-
worthy because it shows another important diﬀerence in political management
methods in Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago:
The parties in Trinidad generally do not make open public ap-
peals for communal support. Overtly and publicly, they project an
image of inter-ethnic tolerance and multi-ethnic following. They
have woven a delicate strategy that reconciles tolerance with intol-
erance, bigotry with enlightenment and love with hate. In contra-
diction to their carefully crafted ‘clean’ public image, they make
racist and communalist appeals at the grassroots levels.’58
(The consequences may be the same for race-based voting but Trinidad’s
‘public deception’ has perhaps helped to reduce open conﬂict.)
The 1995 general election was a clear demonstration of race-based voting.
The UNC and the PNM won 17 seats each. Of these, the PNM had 15 se-
cure seats in areas of high African concentration while the UNC had 14 secure
seats, within Indian majority areas. Many non-committed voters, among them
previous NAR supporters, also voted for the UNC, whose platform of ‘one
love’ and unity was consistent with NAR principles. Meanwhile, the PNM
lost votes, particularly among some middle class groups, when it rejected the
UNC/NAR’s call for a government of national unity; the PNM declared that
uniﬁed government was ‘a recipe for chaos’.59 The UNC/NAR coalition al-
lowed Basdeo Panday and A.N.R. Robinson an additional two seats and they
were installed as Prime Minister and Minister Extraordinaire (later President)
respectively.
The UNC/NAR coalition had to contend with competing claims and expec-
tations: that is, for special attention to the Indian community, who considered
themselves eﬀectively ‘locked out’ of public appointments under the PNM’s
rule. They had to manage this ‘aﬃrmative action’ programme in a way that
did not marginalize and inﬂame the black population.
58Ibid. Premdas and Ragoonath, p. 36
59Ibid. Premdas and Ragoonath, pp. 42-43
22Table 1: Trinidad and Tobago: Predominantly African Constituencies- PNM
%Votes. (Source:Premdas, 1996; LaGuerre, 1983 and Trinidad and Tobago
Electoral Commission Reports)
Constituency 1976 1981 1991 1995 2002
Diego Martin East 78.1 62.4 65 70.34 74.0
Diego Martin West 77.8 66.7 60.99 74.88 75.2
Diego Martin Central 70.1 54.7 57.81 76.56 76.9
Port of Spain North 70.9 54.7 – – –
Port of Spain North-St. Ann’s West – – 63.04 77.83 81.6
Laventille 80.5 82.2 – – –
Laventille E./Morvant – – 73.05 80.32 87.2
Laventille West – – 81.35 84.87 94
St Anne’s East 85.6 77.3 74.90 72.62 78.8
Arouca 64.3 64.8 – – –
Arouca North – – 61.06 65.63 73.4
Arouca South – – 68.99 71.87 81.4
Arima 62 66.7 60.39 61.08 72.4
Toco/Manzanella 67.7 70 52 57.35 61.25
San Fernando East 66.5 65 67.59 65.35 65.4
Point Fortin 60.3 65.9 56.94 62.20 65.2
La Brea 62.2 67.1 59.66 60.77 61.03
Port of Spain South 85.5 62.4 73.44 69.78 78.5
Panday won the 2000 elections amidst allegations of corruption and what the
UNC government depicted as persistent persecution from the PNM-loyal me-
dia. The PNM disputed the election results on the basis that two of the UNC’s
candidates had not satisﬁed Trinidad and Tobago’s citizenship criteria for elec-
tion. Opposition leader Manning then called for demonstrations against the
illegal UNC government. This was a frantic period: Panday warned that var-
ious groups were planning to seize power; ethnic tensions escalated; and three
government ministers left the UNC, charging dissatisfactory internal politics
and corruption. New elections were called in 2001, and this resulted in a split
of 18 seats each in Parliament. President A.N.R. Robinson broke the tie when
he appointed Patrick Manning and the PNM to government; however, this
move resulted in 10 months of deadlock. Indians, who had long felt excluded
from government and the bureaucracy, saw Manning’s appointment as yet an-
other case of discrimination. Over the years then, the political atmosphere has
become increasingly acrimonious. Manning was forced to dissolve Parliament
and call for fresh elections. The October 7, 2002 election broke the deadlock,
23Table 2: Trinidad and Tobago: Predominantly Indian Constituencies- % UNC
Votes. (Source: Premdas, 1996 and Trinidad and Tobago Electoral Commis-
sion Reports)
Constituency 1991 1995 2002
Oropouche 59.26 81.23 83.2
Naparima 56.81 77.43 80.9
Caroni East 57.93 68.37 71.6
Caroni Central 51.84 65.57 64.3
Siparia 65.92 79.61 83.3
Tabaquite 41.40 72.22 71.5
Couva North 72.90 75.90 75.6
Couva South 55.31 66.51 67.3
Chauguanas 46.20 71.81 78.6
though with highly charged political and ethnic confrontations: the PNM won
20 seats and the UNC16.60
4 The Limits of Structural Reforms: Jamaica,
Cuba and the French Caribbean
These country reviews emphasize the signiﬁcance of prudent political man-
agement, particularly in contexts of real or perceived horizontal inequalities,
long and harsh histories of subjugation and discrimination and complex (and
often conﬂicting) manifestations of accountability to subgroups rather than
to the state. Guyana presents one of the more extreme cases of the perver-
sion of ethnicity and race in the Caribbean, for there—despite the promises
at Independence—political leaders have manipulated cross group animosities,
with costly consequences for communal relations, economic growth, political
stability and development. By comparison with these two countries, Belize,
though it has an even more diverse population, does not have similar levels of
political and ethnic conﬂict. Tensions exist and racism pervades private circles
but dominant and opposing groups tend to be ‘broadly ﬂexible in their partisan
loyalties and choices’.61 In many respects, the threat of Guatemalan occupa-
60Frontline, Volume 19, Issue 23, November 9-22, 2002
61T. Thorndike, ‘Belizean Political Parties: the Independence Crisis and After’, in Journal
of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics Vol.21 No. 2, p. 197
24tion is a unifying factor, as are some common cultural practices. Premdas
observes that though Creoles continue to claim cultural superiority, the Mayas
feel historically disadvantaged and there is higher poverty incidence in some
ethnic groups than others; people generally believe that they can improve their
circumstances through education and training. As Premdas sees it, ‘there is no
overt system of closure that creates rigid ethno-economic compartments; there
is more ‘classism than ‘ethnicism at some levels of life in Belize; there is little
consistent correlative coincidence between colour and economic well being in
Belize’.62 Consequently, ethnic identities do not assume the salience that it
does in Guyana; there are other issues that inﬂuence political choice. This is
not to minimize the signiﬁcant challenges in Belize and the reforms required
to contain racial tensions and class divisions. Rather, experiences in Belize
conﬁrm that tensions may be more manageable where they are not politicised,
and where the governing structures oﬀer fair chances to all segments of the
society.
Frances Stewart’s63 study of horizontal inequalities arrives at similar conclu-
sions: ethnic tensions are more likely to escalate in conditions of low material
security; high levels of inter-group inequality; political exclusion of (or pref-
erential access to) select groups; where there are low levels of political and
national consensus, and where, according to O’Donnell, societies have weak
liberal and republican values.64 Therefore, Stewart recommends inclusive po-
litical, social and economic policies, with the following governing principles:
• All major groups in society [should] participate in political power, the
administration, the army and police;
• Horizontal inequality in economic aspects (assets, employment and in-
come)should be moderate;
• Horizontal inequality in social participation and achieved well-being [should]
also be moderate.65
62R. Premdas, ‘Belize: Identity and Ethnicity in a Multi-Ethnic State’
http://www.uwichill.edu.bb/bnccde/belize/conference/papers/premdas.html
63F. Stewart,‘The Root Causes of Conﬂict: Some Conclusions’ QEH Working Paper Series,
Number 16
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25The objective, Stewart maintains, should be equality rather than moderation
in all these aspects. Political inclusivity is the prime (though more diﬃcult)
goal since monopolization of power normally produces other forms of inequal-
ity. Yet, as Stewart admits, these are formidable objectives, which is hardly
the priority within many developing countries. Even where governments are in-
clined to promote fairness and equity, donor agencies and governments, which
can themselves (overtly or covertly) provoke conﬂict, may resist or prevent
positive state actions.
One of the limits to Stewart’s arguments is that it does not account suﬃ-
ciently for the ways in which policies that promote group equality trigger class
divisions. For example, there are reports that South Africa’s aﬃrmative action
policies have created a widening gulf between an upwardly mobile black middle
class and a signiﬁcant black lower class. These new inequalities also present
serious problems. In addition, Eyben notes66 that the horizontal inequality
approach prioritizes a categorical (as opposed to relational) understanding of
inequality and poverty. The categorical interpretation concentrates, for exam-
ple, on the proportion of Moslems, Hindus and Christians who have political
positions or access to employment. The relational interpretation attends to the
deeper underlying power relations that sustain discrimination and inequalities,
recognising that structural reforms may not resolve these.
Both Jamaica and Cuba have used structural reforms to address racial in-
equalities and political ideology to transform racial disquiet into class antago-
nisms. Welfare measures in both countries have been stalled by both internal
and external factors. Both country experiences demonstrate some of the prin-
cipal constraints to structural reforms. The case study of Jamaica raises ques-
tions about the wisdom of a political strategy that redeﬁnes understandings
of inequality without substantially transforming the conditions for repression.
4.1 Jamaica: Politics, Race and Class
In the 1930s, Jamaica’s racial composition was quite similar to the rest of the
Caribbean: there was a majority black population; a growing group of coloured
persons, including immigrant Indentured labourers, and a white minority (ap-
proximately 1%), who owned the vast portion of the resources. Subsequently,
Afro-Europeans, Lebanese and Chinese joined the capitalist class and began
66Personal communication
26to challenge white hegemony.67 From the 1950s to 1960s, the economic base
also expanded to include manufacturing and tourism; these industries even-
tually overtook sugar and became major export earners. Jamaica’s economy
grew rapidly in this period, averaging about 6% annually. However, much
of the gains from growth were still concentrated among an upper class of 21
families, the business sectors and the middle class. In 1958, by comparison,
the lowest income groups had only a 2.2% share of total income (‘whereas the
wealthiest 5%had a 30.2% share’).68 Stratiﬁcation was justiﬁed and supported
by a white, ‘racist, social ideology and the dependence of the society on a Eu-
ropean imperial power, Great Britain. The dominant class ideology assumed
that landowners, the wealthy, and the highly educated had a natural claim
to national leadership, pre-eminent political inﬂuence, and social wisdom.69
Many among the lower class had come to accept their inferiority.
As Lewis describes: ‘The grim reality of Jamaican life in the mid 1960s was
of racial separatism, undeclared yet virulent, that aﬀected every nook and
cranny of interpersonal and inter-class relationships, based on a social system
characterized by strongly entrenched class-colour correlations’70
The Rastafarian movement, which began in the 1930s, and the Black Power
movement of the late 1960s raised issues of race and class. Both Marcus Gar-
vey and Guyanese lecturer Walter Rodney were important in this regard and
Payne71 notes that ‘Rodney brought together class and racial issues in pre-
cisely the way that the structure of the Jamaican political system sought to
prevent and to which it was most vulnerable’. The Jamaican government con-
sidered Rodney and his Black Power pronouncements, a threat to security,
particularly because Rodney had extended his ‘groundings’ to Rastafarians
and the dispossessed. Consequently, Rodney was expelled from Jamaica. The
ensuing riots proved that he had been successful in establishing the connec-
tions between race and class exploitation. Norman Manley, ﬁrst leader for the
People’s National Party, acknowledged that ‘whereas the mission of his gener-
ation had been to achieve the goal of political independence, the task of the
67Trevor Munroe, The Politics of Constitutional Decolonization, Kingston: Institute for
Social and Economic Research, 1972. See also L. Broom, ‘Social Diﬀerentiation of Jamaica’,
American Sociological Review, Volume 19, No. 2, (1954), pp. 115-125.
68C. Stone, in S. Wellisz and R. Findlay, The Political Economy of Poverty, Equity and
Growth: Five Small Open Economies, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993, p. 172.
69C. Stone, Democracy and Clientelism in Jamaica, New Jersey: Transaction Books, 1985,
p.15.
70G. Lewis,The Growth of the Modern West Indies,London: Mac Gibbon and Kee, 1967,
p.191
71A. Payne, ‘The Rodney Riots in Jamaica: The Background and Signiﬁcance of the
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27next was to proceed to social and economic renewal’. His son, Michael Man-
ley, attempted to make these tangible social changes. From 1972 to 1979, in
particular, his People’s National Party (PNP) introduced a distinctly socialist
agenda, which featured an expansionary ﬁscal policy for social improvement
and increased production. Like Fidel Castro, Manley also attempted to deal
with racial divisions. He espoused the value of blackness, embraced Rastafar-
ians and reggae music and, arguably, succeeded in paving the way for blacks
to be included in the more visible and higher status occupations.72 Currently,
black people are well represented in the middle/upper middle classes of society,
which Robotham73 underscores, is no small achievement.
Yet, Jamaica’s middle class leaders have had a ‘contradictory and problem-
atic role’.74 One of the more lively debates in contemporary Jamaican politics
concerns the extent to which successive leaders have delivered on the promises
they made to the lower classes at Independence. Henke75 is convinced that
political leaders have reneged on their obligations and denied Jamaican people
the substantive freedoms expected from democracy. These include equal access
to justice, ‘meaningful participation in political processes and access to eco-
nomic resources’. He provides evidence of undue use of force against the poor
in Jamaica; symbol manipulation in order to maintain a certain view of his-
tory and entrench middle class positions (which includes quashing race-based
forms of protest); rule by dictat; and eﬀorts to stiﬂe opposing opinions and
public accountability. Robotham contends that Henke does not provide a com-
plete picture of the middle classes’ role in development, for these groups have
also extended social provisions to a black majority who, up to the 1960s, had
very limited access to health, education and lucrative occupations. However,
he does not deny that the middle class has failed in a number of important
respects.
Certainly, Jamaica’s garrison constituencies are disturbing examples of how
politicians have stiﬂed protest from the black underclass by appeasing them
with scarce beneﬁts and spoils, equipping them with arms and building se-
cure blocks of political support. The 1997 National Committee on Political
Tribalism concluded:
72A. M. Waters, Race, Class and Political Symbols: Rastafari and Reggae in Jamaican
Politics, New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1985.
73D. Robotham,’Freedom Ossiﬁed or Economic Crisis: A Comment on Holger Henke’ in
Identities Vol. 8, 3, pp. 451-466
74P.Antrobus and N. Peacoke, ‘Yabba Still Empty: Comments on Holger Henke’s ‘Free-
dom Ossiﬁed: Political Culture and the Public Use of History in Jamaica’ and Don
Robotham’s Response to Henke’ in Identities Vol, 8, 3, pp. 441-450
75Henke, Freedom Ossiﬁed: Political Culture and the Public Use of History, Identities,
Vol. 8, 3, 2001, pp.413-440
28It is beyond debate that party politics was the cradle for fac-
tional politics, that the political clashes of the late 1960s partic-
ularly in the election period of 1967 ushered in the era of ﬁrearm
oﬀences against the person, and that party politics remain a ma-
jor cause... Many politicians have beneﬁted from the unrest and
displacement, which are features of communities with high levels
of unemployment; a proliferation of unskilled and virtually un-
employable youth, pervasive poverty of purse and spirit...Poverty
facilitates the development of political tribalism
These areas consistently record 100% support for their political leaders.
They cannot do otherwise. Party emissaries, normally gang leaders who main-
tain a close relationship with the constituency’s Member of Parliament, assure
the vote.
This politicization aﬀects access to services. Not surprisingly, private com-
panies will not invest in these areas; the quality of available services is poor;
children attend school irregularly (much depends on whether or not there
is inter-community conﬂict); hospitals located in one garrison constituency
cannot provide services to persons from opposition areas.76 One will likely
discover similar political behaviour in communities that are in close proximity
to garrison constituencies,. Figueroa77 explains that this is because close and
adjoining communities are often subject to the outreach activities of members
of the garrison constituencies.
However, with reduced access to spoils, communities are switching their
allegiances. In 1997, voters in one community (Rema) opted to vote en masse
for the PNP, since the JLP had failed to deliver on promises. This meant that
community members no longer had access to nearby health facilities (since
the local hospital was located in a JLP constituency). Residents now had
to travel to the father PNP constructed Comprehensive Clinic. Additionally,
drug barons are now assuming prominence in these areas; the situation has
spiralled and politicians are losing control.
The enclaves are not representative of the wider Jamaica, where citizens
76J. Moncrieﬀe, Problems of Parliamentary Accountability in Jamaica: Consequences for
Health Administration’ in Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, Vol. 39, 2,
2001 and ‘Accountability: Idea, Ideals, Constraints in Democratization Vol. 8, 3, 2001.
77M. Figueroa, ‘Garrison Communities in Jamaica: 1962-1993: Their Growth and Impact
on Political Culture’. Paper presented to the symposium on Democracy and Democrati-
zation in Jamaica: Fifty Years of Adult Suﬀrage, December 6-7, 1994, Faculty of Social
Sciences, University of the West Indies, Mona
29still defend their freedom to express opinions, particularly through a vigilant
media. However, they do provide an extreme example of how Jamaica’s politi-
cians have inﬂuenced new social and cultural identities by promoting political
factions that divert attention from the problems of race and class. In the
meantime, social dislocation remains.
Jamaica must now ﬁnd ways of including two distinct political ‘tribal’ groups,
which are both supported by a majority black underclass. In recent political
campaigns, references to race have escalated. Prime Minister Percival Pat-
terson assumed oﬃce after Michael Manley’s retirement, amidst widespread
glee that ‘it is black man’s time now’. Racial animosities persist. Robotham
observes that since Patterson’s election, sections of the brown upper middle
and white upper class have become extremely critical of government policies,
while sections of the black middle classes are equally sensitive to criticisms
from these groups.78
Paradoxically, in the midst of this celebration of blackness (especially preva-
lent among the middle class), beauty is still deﬁned in terms of lighter shades
and ﬁnely textured hair. Recently, there were reports of black women in the
ghettoes of Kingston who were ﬁnding ‘alternative’—potentially self-harming—
means to lighten their complexions. It is not uncharacteristic to hear ‘black’
parents lament the depth of ‘blackness’ of their children’s complexion. Simi-
larly, reggae music—formerly one of the prime avenues of black protest—has in
its modern form been used to promote the greater desirability of the ‘browning’
(lighter mixed race).
One of the crucial areas of disagreement in the Henke-Robotham-Antrobus
/Peacoke debate is the extent to which Jamaica’s political leaders have ade-
quate scope to address long-standing inequalities. Do globalization and the
country’s (almost mandatory) commitment to neoliberal policies prevent eﬀec-
tive social action? Manley’s social reform policies (1970s) had limited results,
not only because of the government’s economic mismanagement but because
the United States objected to the socialist ideology and to the direction of the
economy. The Jamaica Labour Party’s (JLP) structural adjustment policies
were designed to create a stable macroeconomic environment but entailed sig-
niﬁcant social sacriﬁces that did little to bridge the polarised class structure.
Therefore, Robotham contends that external obligations conﬁne government
to set courses of action; there are no alternatives to the market. However,
Antrobus and Peacoke maintain that there are spaces for action in areas that
would ‘address fundamental questions of social equality and personal and col-
lective realization’. Only these tangible responses will move understandings of
78D. Robotham,‘Freedom Ossiﬁed or Economic Crisis: A Comment on Holger Henke’
30‘freedom’ from mere symbolism to practical relevance.
The debates, which are set to continue, raise very important issues about
the ways in which eﬀorts to stem horizontal disparities can produce new, ver-
tical, forms of inequalities; about the potentially harmful consequences of the
politicization of race and class; the substantive structural and social reforms
that may be required to address inequalities and the internal and external
constraints to change. (We return to these issues in Section 5.)
4.1.1 Cuba and the French Departments
Until, the 19th century, Cuba was described as the ‘ever faithful isle’. Revo-
lution seemed highly unlikely in a country that remained a loyalist stronghold
long after colonies in North and South America had begun to achieve their in-
dependence. Colonialism was maintained in Cuba and the slave trade used (il-
legally) to replenish supplies of slaves, even up to 1864.79 Like other Caribbean
countries, slaves (about 36% of the population in 1846) were forced to labour
in brutal conditions. Fearing the type of collaboration and revolt that obtained
in Haiti, slaves were kept apart from the Creoles (approximately 17 percent
of the population), who themselves had certain constraints on their freedom.
Whites were intent that ‘Cuba would be either Spanish or African; it would
be Spanish or it would be another Haiti’.80
The 1868 Revolution came from an unlikely source: a group of prosper-
ous white anti-colonialists who were bent on securing Cuba’s independence.
This group fashioned a multiracial army, comprised largely of mixed groups
(termed Creoles) and freed slaves. Black soldiers acquired positions of author-
ity, as colonels and captains in the army. Signiﬁcantly, a distinct and powerful
anti-racial ideology was used to support the revolution, which inﬂuenced the
foundation of the nation. Ferrer contends that ‘the very struggle against Spain
had transformed Cuba into a land where there were no whites or blacks, only
Cubans’.81 Despite the contradictions inherent in the nationalist movement,
it is important that this new ideology became popular at a time when Euro-
pean and North American scientists had begun to oﬀer biological explanations
for racial inferiority and superiority. It was in this context that Jos´ eM a r t i
and other nationalist leaders argued that ‘race was merely a tool used locally
to divide the anti-colonial eﬀort and globally by men who invented textbook




31races in order to justify expansion and empire’. Therefore, while racial strati-
ﬁcation was intensifying in the United States, Cuba’s nationalist leaders were
encouraging racial harmony. Undoubtedly, not all within the white population
accepted these changes and even prominent nationalist leaders occasionally re-
sorted to popular stereotypes about the black race. However, these ideologies
provided the space for the black population to challenge persistent discrimi-
nation, even within ‘open’ occupations, such as the military.
The American intervention stalled this movement towards ‘a raceless so-
ciety’. Americans attempted—and was to some extent successful—to re-
segregate Cuba. Plans to restrict Creole and black access to education, civil
and property rights were tempered, given objections from the nationalists but
the threat to withhold independence unless the nationalists ensured good be-
haviour among their ranks and ‘promote the right sort of men’ resulted in
new forms of segregation. White oﬃcers were selected and blacks refused as
uneducated; consequently, new forms of segregation began.82
Fidel Castro’s revolutionary government adopted the founding ideologies of
the 19th century nationalist movement and made considerable eﬀorts to dis-
mantle all forms of discrimination. In 1959, Castro called for public debates
on racism, in which he promoted unity among the races.83 The government
proposed that there were four substantial national objectives: to provide em-
ployment, lower the cost of living, raise the salaries of lowest paid workers and
end discrimination in the workplace.84 Racial discrimination, he maintained,
was rooted in economics; therefore race relations would change if the economic
base were transformed. Fernandez states that political unity was paramount
for the government and that ‘the racial problem was subsumed within the
general battle against social injustice in all of its manifestations’. The govern-
ment eliminated the structural and legal provisions that had prevented social
mobility. Its policy of integration dismantled overt forms of racism such as
segregated clubs; free health care and education resulted in noteworthy im-
provements in basic indicators such as life expectancy and child mortality.
As Fernandez shows, the standard of living among black Cubans increased
markedly in the ﬁrst decades after the revolution. These changes did not elim-
inate private expressions of racism and the preponderance of blacks among the
poor but they did convince the Castro regime that the race problem had been
solved. By 1962, racism had become a muted issue in Cuba, and the govern-
82Ibid.
83A. De la Fuente, ‘ The Resurgence of Racism in Cuba’, NACLA Report on the Americas,
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84N. Fernandez, ‘The Changing Discourse on Race in Contemporary Cuba’ International
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32ment’s control of the media ensured that that the policy of silence remained
intact.
Since the economic downturn of the 1990s, Castro’s welfare programme is
becoming dislodged. The proportion of poor blacks has been increasing and
social problems are resurfacing, including higher crime rates among the black
population. Observers note that over the last decade, there are more overt
manifestations of discrimination against blacks. The media continues to pub-
licize popular stereotypes, which portray the undesirability of the black skin
and the attractiveness of lighter complexions. The ‘policy of silence’ has be-
gun to crumble. Various groups are questioning the wisdom of a strategy that
refuses to confront persistent racial prejudice. Some argue that such a stance
means that the depth and prevalence of racism is not understood or dealt with.
Structural reforms are insuﬃcient; inclusion depends on consistent attacks on
racist ideologies.
The new ‘rainbow nation’ of South Africa is presently contending with the
very issue. Given that country’s history of intense ethnic divisions (manip-
ulated with great success by the English and apartheid regime), the ANC
government has opted to ‘redirect’ the nation’s focus from its history of stark
ethnic divisions to the project of nation building. The government is encour-
aging a new ideology of ‘oneness’, which, some may well argue, simply masks
underlying hostilities. However, the government fears—perhaps credibly—that
open discussions of inter-group rivalries will foment tensions in an environment
that needs to conduct fundamental social and economic reconstruction, with
minimal disruption. Is this approach to ‘inclusion’ tenable?
De la Fuente85 contradicts critics of the ‘myths of racial/ethnic democracy’
who argue that that these philosophies not only mask underlying tensions
but also ‘demobilize subordinate groups’. De la Fuente’s counter-argument is
persuasive: First, ‘mobilization is not the only means to social progression’
and, second, such ideologies can be used to ‘legitimize inclusion’. In the case
of Cuba, he maintains, pronouncements of raceless equality ‘provided blacks
with rhetorical tools to claim full membership in the nation; this discourse
opened opportunities for legitimate mobilization and demands’.
Notably, however, assimilation and ideologies of ‘raceless’ equality have had
mixed results in the French Departments of Guadeloupe and Martinique. In
1946, both countries graduated from colonial to d´ epartment status and the
inhabitants became French citizens. This allows French Caribbean peoples to
85De la Fuente, Alejandro, ‘Myths of Racial Democracy: Cuba, 1900-1912’, Latin Amer-
ican Research Review, Vol. 34, No, 3, 1999
33claim rights, as any other within the French metropole, including full social
beneﬁts. However, d´ epartmentalisation also entailed a denial of cultural diﬀer-
ence and, concurrently, respect for the ‘indivisibility of the nation’. Ducoulom-
bier acknowledges that while this has raised the proﬁle of issues such as gen-
der equality, they deny the particular circumstances of black women, many of
whom feel no sense of community with the white women who, purportedly,
advocate on their behalf. Despite oﬃcial provisions, the French Caribbean is
deﬁned in terms of race, and its inhabitants are regarded as outsiders to the
metropole. Ducoulombier reports claims of racial discrimination in areas such
as employment. French Caribbean women, who are often advised to change
their names for job applications, are convinced that being white is the prime
criterion for promotion.86
D´ epartmentalisation has reinforced and extended French cultural hegemony.
Whereas Creole languages and norms were still facilitated in the colonial pe-
riod, Martinique and Guadeloupe have been bombarded with French housing
styles, language, patterns of consumption, history and education. Frenchness
meant progress, including vastly improved living standards. Thus, French
Caribbean people were encouraged to migrate to France in order to secure
better education and life chances. According to Ducoulombier, ﬁrst genera-
tion emigrants to France claim that they were routinely exploited and that
their subjugation was largely ignored because of the governing policy of in-
divisibility. Racial and ethnic relations are reputedly better in the islands.
According to some reports, there is genuine social mixing in Guadeloupe; all
the ethnic communities (descendants of African slaves, French planters, mu-
lattoes, French indentured labourers, East Indians, Middle Eastern traders)
are regarded as ‘equally Guadeloupean’. Notably, this ethnic accommodation
does not apply to Haitian immigrants; neither does it preclude a feeling of
loss of identity among Guadeloupeans. Many, especially among the middle
classes, are concerned that their ‘culture’ is being devalued and that Guade-
loupeans have been cut oﬀ from their past. Brodwin’s87 surveys within the
region reveal common sentiments: ‘Assimilation is still going forward, and we
in Guadeloupe don’t have any grounding. We are facing something that is
moving very fast, but we are not in control at all...‘We Guadeloupeans don’t
know who we are;’ ‘We don’t know whether we are French or ourselves.’
86A. Ducoulombier, ‘Parity is about ‘race’: French republican citizenship and the French
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345 From Nation-State to State-Nation:
Conclusions
Linz, Stepan and Yadav challenge the common assumptions that ‘every state
should be a nation and every nation should be a state’. The ﬁrst assumption
has its roots in the French tradition of cultural and political homogeneity. As
in Martinique and Guadeloupe, this forced ‘oneness’ requires acceptance of the
superiority of French mores, language and scholarship, in exchange for broad
social provisions and generally acceptable living standards. The approach may
not be problematic in culturally homogenous societies, where citizens share
common historical bonds; however, it is patently prejudicial and increasingly
untenable in countries with ‘politically salient cultural and/or linguistic di-
versity’.88 In such diverse contexts, governments may use various political
tactics to construct nation states. The country examples describe a range of
these: supplying incentives for assimilation; coercion and manipulation; exclu-
sion and/or adverse incorporation; reframing identities around select national
symbols. Additionally, political leaders may use the guise of nation build-
ing for personal gain. They can actively foment tensions and propel their
countries from conditions of multiculturalism to multinationalism. All these
strategies, altruistic or perverse, inﬂuence the extent to which and pace at
which it is possible to subsequently build ‘state-nations’ out of these forced
‘nation-states’.
‘State-nations’, as Linz, Stepan and Yadav describe, ‘respect the legitimate
political expression of active socio-cultural cleavages; try to accommodate
these without privileging any one claim; and seek to build a sense of political
community by emphasizing multiple identities’. The premise for this stance
is that identities are not ﬁxed or primordial; that even seemingly disparate
groups may share common interests and objectives; that emphasizing these
common bonds is critical for building tolerant societies; and that the more
restrictive nation-state mindset may no longer be feasible in divided societies,
where the issue of identity is being increasingly politicized. However, there is
ample evidence that structural reforms may fail to bridge divisions, particu-
larly in highly unequal societies. In ideal circumstances, governments would
opt for constitutional arrangements that accommodate and respect diversity
and, importantly, aim for socially just policies that preclude individual and
group discrimination and deprivations.
Frances Stewart emphasizes that ‘perceptions’—which may not be factually
88Linz, Stepan and Yadav, Draft, p. 3
35based—can both precipitate and prevent conﬂict. In highly unequal condi-
tions, people are susceptible to manipulation by the most charismatic and
powerful. As our country examples attest, political leaders also rely on im-
age, political language and persuasion. These tools, though tenuous, can have
tremendous utility and power, particularly in the short term. Image and lan-
guage lose their credibility when they are not supported by tangible actions
or are proven to rest upon false premises. Eventually, it becomes diﬃcult
to convince the electorate of noble intent. Arguably, Caribbean politics has
fallen into this state of disrepair. People are sceptical and disillusioned; they
are wary of promises of structural and social change. However, the public
must share culpability. Constituents, who have become accustomed to special
favours, often pressure their representatives for particularistic policy-making;
not all are interested in fairness and tolerance. Similarly, political leaders are
likely to resist constitutional reforms if they proﬁt from divisions and privi-
leged relationships. Even where leaders are amenable, traditions of inter and
intra-party distrust can impede collaboration, redistribution and inclusion.
These are among the factors that have constrained recent reform eﬀorts in the
Caribbean.
5.1 Constitutional Reform - Guyana
Following the January 1998 Herdmanston Accord89, Guyana’s National As-
sembly resolved to establish a special committee to determine the Terms of
Reference and composition of the constitutional review commission. The Com-
mission, with representation from various segments of the society, conducted
consultations over six months and made 171 recommendations. The Parlia-
mentary Select Committee reviewed and reﬁned these recommendations for
inclusion in the constitution. The new constitution enshrined seven new com-
missions, with responsibility for ethnic relations, women and gender equality,
human rights, the Indigenous people, the rights of the child, public procure-
ment and local government. Commissions are required to monitor and review
pertinent legislation, conduct research, educate the public and investigate com-
plaints. To ensure impartiality, commissions are funded through the consoli-
dated fund rather than through a ministry.
89This was an agreement between CARICOM, the PPP/C and the PNC, which aimed
to resolve matters arising from the disputed 1997 elections. Parties agreed to a shortened
period of government for the PPP/C and to constitutional reform. Note that the PPP/C is
the new name for the People’s Progressive Party. In principle, it demonstrates the party’s
alliance with civic groups. Commentators suggest that in practice there is no real alliance.
36There are other important provisions, including the establishment of term
limits on the presidency and the increase in parliamentary powers. Sectoral
standing committees should provide close oversight of government actions; the
standing committee for appointments should appoint commission members,
thereby reducing the inﬂuence of the executive; the Auditor General must
now report directly to Parliament instead of through the Minister of Finance.
However, there already are complaints that the government has breached the
constitution in certain areas and has been laggard about instituting the com-
missions. The PPP blames the PNC’s intransigence for the lack of progress in
areas where both parties were meant to cooperate. The PNC ascribes its non-
cooperation to its profound disappointment with government performance.
However, perhaps the more important issues are that the constitution does
provide the basis on which the government can be held accountable and that
various civil groups are urging observance of its provisions.
The Amerindians, though not entirely satisﬁed with their allowances un-
der the constitution, believe that the new provisions can, nevertheless, allow
them to gain in those areas that the Commission rejected. Speciﬁcally, there
was some disagreement with the proposal that Amerindians should be allowed
special privileges, including land rights and bilingual education. However,
the Commission consented to include a reference to Indigenous Peoples in the
Preamble to the Constitution; to include the rights of Indigenous Peoples un-
der the section that addresses Fundamental Rights; to establish an Indigenous
People’s Commission, which would investigate issues such as land rights; and
to state that Amerindians have the right to self-determination, particularly
through local government institutions. Hinterland Highlights, a publication
that exhibits developments in Amerindian communities, notes that commu-
nities are receiving land titles (though the government has been somewhat
resistant to grant individual as opposed to community titles)90 and that some
schools have been introducing local dialects into their curriculum. In South
Rupununi, where most villagers speak Wapisiana, funding has been secured to
provide Wapisiana textbooks. Furthermore, local newspapers are publishing
Amerindian dialects. Invariably, much of these gains are the result of improved
organization and representation across Amerindian societies.
90Amerinidian Land Demarcation-Some Communities present request for extensions, titles
in Hinterland Highlights, Vol. 1, No 1, May 2003
375.2 Power Sharing: Guyana and Trinidad
Currently, there are debates in both Trinidad and Tobago and Guyana on the
need for power sharing at diﬀerent levels of government. The proposals are
not new. Traditionally, they come for opposition parties, which perceive less
need for reform when they enter oﬃce. For example, Trinidad’s opposition
leader, Baseo Panday, recommended an electoral system in which the Presi-
dent and Prime Minister are appointed from the parties that win the largest
and second largest proportion of votes. Only this system would prevent the
clear race-based voting that allowed the People’s National Congress and the
United National Congress to win equal numbers of seats (18) in the 2001 elec-
tions.91 The PNC in Guyana have proposed new forms of inclusive governance,
while admitting it had refused similar PPP gestures. Other commentators
are persuaded that a more inclusive form of government is indispensable for
democracy and development and broach various possible models, patterned on
South Africa, Northern Ireland and Suriname. However, there are many scep-
tics. Ryan92, for example, does not anticipate that this sort of collaboration
is likely in Trinidad and Tobago and considers it especially diﬃcult to achieve
in Guyana, where each political party is seen as a threat to the other.
At present, governments in Trinidad and Tobago and Guyana are not acced-
ing to requests for cross party inclusion in government. Guyana’s President
Bharrat Jagdeo considers power-sharing a sure route to gridlock. In one inter-
view, he charged that the PNC has not ‘lived up’ to its responsibilities under
the new constitution, which formally includes the Opposition in standing com-
mittees. Power sharing would not work in the absence of mutual trust.
Let’s build trust. Let’s get a period of building trust. Let’s work
on the crime issue; let’s see how that goes and then at sometime
in the future ... let’s put to the people of the country if they want
us to move to another stage, that is executive power-sharing.93
The PPP/C has now been charged with ‘grandstanding’ in a context where
there is evidence of resurging political/race motivated violence.94
91‘Power Sharing Answer to Racial Insecurity in Guyana, Trinidad Starbroek News,J u n e
11, 2002.
92S. Ryan, ‘Why Power Sharing Won’t Work, Posted August 25th 2002, Trinidad Express
93Patrick Denny, Try power sharing in parliament ﬁrst - Jagdeo, Posted January 30th
2003. guyanacaribbeanpolitics.com. Source: Interview with Starbroek News
94D. Hinds, ‘Power Sharing: Towards a New Political Culture’, Posted February 18, 2003
on GuyanaCaribbeanPolitics.com
38There are few examples of executive or legislative power sharing in the
Caribbean and sound reasons to question whether and how such starkly di-
vided political parties can, in the absence of strong appeals from the electorate,
govern smoothly. Will collaboration, in these contexts, pose even more risks
to political stability? What forms of cooperation are most likely to temper
ethnic tensions and maintain stability? Perhaps the most pertinent example
comes from outside of the region. South Africa has managed to contain a
potentially explosive situation. It has formulated an innovative and inclusive
constitution and has, to a signiﬁcant extent, managed to follow its spirit and
stipulations. However, the successes in South Africa have much to do with
Nelson Mandela’s conciliatory leadership and lasting inﬂuence, the continuing
consensus on the greater signiﬁcance of national development within the ANC,
the ways in which the party has re-educated the population and garnered pop-
ular support. Constitutional eﬀectiveness, such as it exists, results from the
willingness and direction that the leaders exhibit. Similar eﬀorts are required
in the Caribbean.
5.3 Building Representative Public Bureaucracies: Guyana
and Trinidad
In both Trinidad and Tobago and Guyana, there have been claims and counter-
claims of discrimination within the public sector. Results from the Centre
for Ethnic Studies’ survey of ‘Employment Practices in the Public Sector’ in
Trinidad conﬁrmed that there were ethnic preferences in employment. The
ﬁndings indicated low proportions of Indians in the highest levels of govern-
ment, though they were well represented at the clerical levels and in the judicial
and professional sectors. The Public Service Commission, with responsibility
for recruitment, discipline and promotions, was also regarded suspiciously and
the researchers discovered valid cause for questioning certain appointments.
Though the report found little to substantiate claims of discrimination, it rec-
ognized that such perceptions existed and were aﬀecting productivity. Con-
sequently, the report recommended the establishment of clear merit criteria,
racial balance on interview panels and consideration of ethnic balance in mak-
ing appointments.95
However, while proponents of aﬃrmative action consider it essential for rec-
tifying balances in the public sector, various commentators warn that any
appearance of favouritism will provoke conﬂict. According to these critics,
aﬃrmative action runs counter to valued principles of merit. Interestingly,
95Centre for Ethnic Studies, Employment Practices in the Public Sector, 1994, vii-ix.
39Boyd96 argues that strategies that seek balanced representation in government
may be insensitive to culture. He corroborates this with evidence that Indians
are not especially attracted to public sector employment. However, the current
PPP government in Guyana sees the ethnic imbalance in the public sector as
a legacy of a colonial policy, which was designed to separate black and Indian
workers and, particularly, to keep Indians working on the estates. Addition-
ally, it claims that the PNC made deliberate eﬀorts to keep the balance intact.
The PPP General Secretary recently charged that the PNC’s policies of ex-
clusion were reﬂected in the rejection of Hindu and Muslim religious practices
in the Forces (Christian chaplains are still appointed to every security force),
inadequate consideration for Indian’s dietary needs, the requirement that all
members must swear allegiance to the PNC and ‘a rigid anti–Indian testing
mechanism’. All these made the forces unattractive to Indians. Consequently,
the PPP proposes a policy of active recruitment and re-education of Indians.97
There is tremendous conﬂict over the appropriate strategy for promoting
inclusion without provoking conﬂict or creating new forms of exclusion. Should
governments adopt a gradual approach? Is more aggressive and immediate
recruitment of previously denied groups required? How can one ensure that
aﬃrmative action is not used solely for political gain? Reputedly, Belize,
despite the acknowledged ethnic tensions, has managed to build a system
where groups do not perceive substantial blocks to recruitment; generally,
people seem to trust that the employment process is fair. Though valuable
lessons may be gleaned from Belize’s experiences, Guyana and Trinidad’s more
fractious history suggests that the path to reform may be unpredictable and
perilous.
5.4 Social Reform: Jamaica
Conditions within Jamaica’s garrison constituencies are proof of the ways in
which deprivation can cause and sustain divisions. They reinforce, too, that
special and targeted group responses are important for reversing inequalities.
As Albert Hirschman98 argues, societies normally tolerate inequalities for a
96D.Boyd, ‘Ethnic Politics in Trinidad and Guyana, Public Administration and Develop-
ment, Vol. 19, pp. 367-379, 1999
97M. Gordon, ‘More inclusivity, yet maintaining standards proposed by PPP to DFC.
Forces must reﬂect demographics of Guyana’ Guyana Information Agency, September 17,
2003.
98A.Hirschman, ‘The Changing Tolerance for Income Inequality in the Course of Economic
Development’ in Essays in Trespassing: Economics to Politics and Beyond Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1989, p. 40
40period, however, ‘this tolerance is like a credit that falls due at a certain stage.
It is extended in the expectation that eventually the disparities will narrow
again’. What governments do within this intervening period is critical for
long-term cross group relations.
As the evidence from Jamaica conﬁrms, eﬀective social action can be denied
where there is huge debt and conﬂicting obligations to donor agencies and
governments. Externally mandated market-oriented priorities can undermine
redistribution and social inclusion. However, governments, even in the absence
of globalization and donor obligations, may deny fundamental rights and priv-
ileges to select groups. They may build their political empires by entrenching
divisions. Accordingly, the National Committee on Political Tribalism in Ja-
maica found that political leaders engineered and proﬁted from the tribalism
in some of the poorest urban areas.
5.5 Contradictions and Challenges: Summary
It is not unreasonable to argue that the ‘state-nation’ approach can raise aware-
ness of diﬀerences and, thereby, incite rather than contain tensions. Notably,
the Cuban government was careful to avoid this and, after initial debate, re-
fused to engage in protracted discussions of race. Instead, the government
maintained that structural reforms were suﬃcient to uproot institutionalized
discrimination. It is diﬃcult to prescribe when certain political messages are or
are not required. However, the Cuban example does show that structural and
social reforms may not be enough to prevent discrimination and deprivations;
at some point, further political intervention may be needed.
There are challenges, too, with addressing disparities. For example, reforms
may be impractical in the short term, particularly where these entail impos-
ing losses on powerful interests. Invariably, how policies are combined and
staged depends in large part on the political and social context. Furthermore,
policies that aim to address cross-group diﬀerences can produce vertical in-
equalities. (Aﬃrmative action programmes can be captured by middle class
groups and exacerbate class divisions.) Much research is needed on optimal
policy combinations.
These country summaries describe various challenges to implementing the
structural and social reforms envisioned for ‘state-nations’. The challenges
are not insurmountable but they do demand prudent and responsible politics,
particularly in small countries where issues tend to appear more pressing and
41magniﬁed. The onus is on political leaders to use politics constructively in
order to transform perceptions and build trust; implement the constitutional
and public sector reforms that both endorse respect for diversity and promote
equity, regardless of race or ethnicity; promote the social and economic policies
that oﬀer the best prospects for individual security and advancement, and that
rectify group disparities. The onus is on the electorate to support and hold







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































44Table 4: Distribution of security forces by rank and race in British Guiana,
1965 (percentages) Source: R. Premdas, ‘Race and Ethnic Relations in Burn-
hamite Guyana,’ in eds D. Dabydeen and B. Samaroo Across the Dark Waters,
p. 54
Negro Indian European Portuguese Mixed Others
Police force
Oﬃcers 80.3 9.1 1.2 1.0 7.9 0.5
Constables 72.8 21.9 - 0.1 4.3 0.9
Volunteer force
Oﬃcers 83.9 5.8 4.4 1.5 2.9 1.5
Lance Corporals
& Privates 89.5 9.8 - 0.5 0.2 -
Special service unit
Oﬃcers 50.0 50.0 - - - -
Constables 51.3 47.0 - - 1.7 -
Special Constabulary
Oﬃcers 55.2 13.8 - 13.8 17.2 -
Constables 74.2 21.9 0.2 0.2 3.4 -
Prisons
Oﬃcers 81.8 - - - 18.8 -
Prison oﬃcers 83.9 16.1 - - - -
Fire Brigade
Oﬃcers 85.2 3.7 - 1.8 9.2 -
Firemen 61.1 21.4 - 1.6 15.9 -
Total
Oﬃcers 79.4 9.4 1.6 1.6 7.5 0.6
Others 75.1 20.6 - 0.2 3.5 0.5
45Table 5: Major political conﬂict events in Guyana: 1948–1999. Source: P.
Mars, ‘Ethnic Conﬂicts in Guyana’, Journal of Peace Research Vol. 38, No.
3, p. 360
Year Event Causal/prominent features Outcome
1948 Enmore riots East Indian sugar workers strike: Police repression; 5 killed;
and massacre better wages/working conditions Commission of Inquiry
1953 Suspension of Marxist PPP electoral victory Military Repression; PPP
Constitution Colonial fears of communism leader jailed; Commission
of Inquiry
1955 PPP split Colonial instigation; leadership Ethnic polarization
ambitions; ideological divisions
1956 PPP purge Resignation of prominent black Further ethnic polarization
leadership cadres
1962 Political violence Capital gains tax; right-wing Chaotic violence; several
agitation; false rumor killed; Commission of Inquiry
1963/ Ethnic violence Opposition to labor relations Chaotic ethnic violence;
1964 Bill; power struggle; foreign hundreds killed; arson/prop-
instigation; general strike property destruction
1969 Rupununi uprising Ranchers/Amerindians demands Military repression;
secession hundreds killed/migrated
1973 Electoral violence PPP protest against rigging of Military reprisals; 2 killed;
elections judicial inquiry
1977 General strike GAWU demand proﬁt share State intransigence; Military/
from GUYSUCO thug violence against strikers
1980 Assassination Walter Rodney bomb blasted; State silence; inquest denied;
military agent implicated Prat Inquest whitewash
1981 Police beatings WPA protest rally broken up; 1 killed; several injured
police/thug violence
1984 TUC split Protest by progressive unions Creation of splinter union
over state control of TUC FITUG
1989 General strike Mass protest over IMF deal State repressive tactics; strike-
signed by PNC government ing workers dismissed
1992 Election violence Opposition party dissatisﬁed Ethnic targeting/violence;
with election results several killed by police
1997 Electoral violence Opposition protest over Caricom mediation
election irregularities
1999 Public service Demand for better pay/work- Ethnic/political violence;
strike ing conditions NGO mediation; arbitration
46Table 6: Eﬀorts Towards Conﬂict Mediation/Resolution. Source: P. Mars,
‘Ethnic Conﬂicts in Guyana’, Journal of Peace Research Vol. 38, No. 3, p.
363
Year Conﬂict Mediation/resolution eﬀorts Outcome
1962 Jagan’s attempt to compromise over Rejected by opposition; unilateral; withdrawal
unpopular budget proposals of budget
1963 Jagan’s several attempts at compromise Compromises rejected by opposition; British
over Labor Relations Bill; also requested refused Commonwealth mediation; LRB with-
mediation by Commonwealth team drawn
1964 Jagan’s oﬀer of equal power-sharing and Power-sharing rejected by opposition; refused
mediation by Kwame Nkrumah Nkrumah mediation
1977 Oﬀer by church bodies to mediate in Church mediation rejected by state; NFG
GAWU/GUYSUCO strike; PPP rejected by PNC; approved by WPA
proposed National Front Government
(NFG)
1985 Hoyte administration accepted Monitors concluded elections rigged; rejected
monitoring of 1985 elections by inter- by Hoyte; Hoyte declared elections ‘above board’
national team; initiated dialogue with dialogue
opposition forces dismissed as insincere
by opposition
1992 International mediations in elections; Elections declared ‘fair’; new PPP government
Carter Center; Commonwealth installed; Race Relations Commission shelved
Secretariat; PPP proposed Race
Relations Commission
1997 NGOs call for Caricom mediation in Recommended peace dialogue between PPP and
elections violence; dialogue frequently PNC (Herdsmanston Accord)
stalled
1998 Caricom initiation of renewed dialogue PPP/PNC talks resumed; stalled again;
(St. Lucia Statement) facilitator appointed
1999 Commonwealth Secretariat initiative Talks resume but haltingly; arbitrator report
for another resumption of talks; contentious; government inquiry into arbitration
arbitrator appointed in PSU general deliberations
strike
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